Partial Information Disclosure in a Contest

9 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2021

See all articles by Derek J. Clark

Derek J. Clark

Tromso University Business School

Tapas Kundu

Oslo Metropolitan University

Date Written: March 18, 2021

Abstract

Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts in the contest, but base their analysis upon active participation in the contest by all types of the informed player. We extend their analysis to equilibria in which some informed types exert no effort in the contest, showing how this changes the type of information disclosure that arises.

Keywords: Contest, Information design, Bayesian persuasion

JEL Classification: D02, D72, D82

Suggested Citation

Clark, Derek J. and Kundu, Tapas, Partial Information Disclosure in a Contest (March 18, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808118 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3808118

Derek J. Clark

Tromso University Business School ( email )

Breivika
Tromsø, NO-9037
Norway

Tapas Kundu (Contact Author)

Oslo Metropolitan University ( email )

Pilestredet 35
Oslo, 0167
Norway

HOME PAGE: http://www.tapaskundu.net

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