Sovereign Debt in the 21st Century

69 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2021 Last revised: 20 Feb 2023

See all articles by Kris James Mitchener

Kris James Mitchener

Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business - Economics Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CEPR; CAGE; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Christoph Trebesch

Kiel Institute for the World Economy; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2021

Abstract

How will sovereign debt markets evolve in the 21st century? We survey how the literature has responded to the eurozone debt crisis, placing “lessons learned” in historical perspective. The crisis featured: (i) the return of debt problems to advanced economies; (ii) a bank-sovereign “doom-loop” and the propagation of sovereign risk to households and firms; (iii) roll-over problems and self-fulfilling crisis dynamics; (iv) severe debt distress without outright sovereign defaults; (v) large-scale sovereign bailouts from abroad; and (vi) creditor threats to litigate and hold out in a debt restructuring. Many of these characteristics were already present in historical debt crises and are likely to remain relevant in the future. Looking forward, our survey points to a growing role of sovereign-bank linkages, legal risks, domestic debt and default, and of official creditors, due to new lenders such as China as well as the increasing dominance of central banks in global debt markets. Questions of debt sustainability and default will remain acute in both developing and advanced economies.

Suggested Citation

Mitchener, Kris James and Trebesch, Christoph, Sovereign Debt in the 21st Century (March 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w28598, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3809570

Kris James Mitchener (Contact Author)

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