Download This PaperNew Anti-Merger Theories
29 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2021
Date Written: January 1, 2001
Abstract
This paper discusses two recent innovations in federal antitrust enforcement of mergers—“unilateral effects” and “innovation markets.” These instruments of merger analysis, despite increasing usage by federal regulators, are inconsistent with modern economic theory, and lead to erroneous and overly restrictive enjoinments of potential mergers. Antitrust regulators should avoid using these and similar instruments in future merger evaluations.
Keywords: antitrust policy, merger guidelines, unilateral effects, innovation markets
JEL Classification: L40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Lopez, Edward J., New Anti-Merger Theories (January 1, 2001). Cato Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2001, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3811325
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