New Anti-Merger Theories

29 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2021

Date Written: January 1, 2001


This paper discusses two recent innovations in federal antitrust enforcement of mergers—“unilateral effects” and “innovation markets.” These instruments of merger analysis, despite increasing usage by federal regulators, are inconsistent with modern economic theory, and lead to erroneous and overly restrictive enjoinments of potential mergers. Antitrust regulators should avoid using these and similar instruments in future merger evaluations.

Keywords: antitrust policy, merger guidelines, unilateral effects, innovation markets

JEL Classification: L40

Suggested Citation

Lopez, Edward J., New Anti-Merger Theories (January 1, 2001). Cato Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2001, Available at SSRN:

Edward J. Lopez (Contact Author)

Western Carolina University ( email )

College of Business
Forsyth 224C
Cullowhee, NC 28723
United States


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