Race, Glass Ceilings, and Lower Pay for Equal Work

72 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2021 Last revised: 23 Jun 2021

See all articles by Deepak Hegde

Deepak Hegde

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Alexander Ljungqvist

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Stockholm School of Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Manav Raj

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Date Written: May 5, 2021

Abstract

Using detailed administrative data that allow us to hold gender, education, productivity, timeliness, and work quality constant, we document that minority patent examiners at the U.S. patent office face substantial glass ceilings and pay gaps. The promotion gap relative to White examiners averages 24.3% for Blacks, 10.5% for Hispanics, and 4.5% for Asians, with Black examiners 41.7% less likely than Whites to be promoted to the highest rank. Consistent with statistical discrimination, we find that the promotion gap for senior Black examiners halves around Obama’s 2008 election win and that greater exposure to successful minority examiners affects managers’ promotion decisions positively. We show that promotion gaps have adverse effects on the services the patent office provides to inventors and society.

Keywords: Promotions, Glass Ceilings, Pay, Discrimination, Race, Patents, Innovation

JEL Classification: D23, O31, O34, J15, D91

Suggested Citation

Hegde, Deepak and Ljungqvist, Alexander and Ljungqvist, Alexander and Raj, Manav, Race, Glass Ceilings, and Lower Pay for Equal Work (May 5, 2021). Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 21-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3811410 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3811410

Deepak Hegde

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Alexander Ljungqvist

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Manav Raj (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

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