Race, Glass Ceilings, and Lower Pay for Equal Work

74 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2021 Last revised: 3 Feb 2022

See all articles by Deepak Hegde

Deepak Hegde

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Alexander Ljungqvist

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Swedish House of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Manav Raj

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Date Written: Feb 2, 2022

Abstract

Using detailed administrative data that allow us to hold gender, education, productivity, timeliness, and work quality constant, we document that minority patent examiners at the U.S. patent office face substantial pay gaps and glass ceilings. The promotion gap relative to White examiners averages 24.4% for Blacks, 10.2% for Hispanics, and 4.7% for Asians, with Black examiners 41.8% less likely than Whites to be promoted to the highest rank. Black supervisors who were promoted slowly themselves tend to promote Black examiners particularly slowly. At the top of the career ladder, we find evidence consistent with statistical discrimination. Promotion gaps hurt examiner productivity and contribute to the growing backlog of unexamined patent applications.

Keywords: Promotions, Glass ceilings, Pay, Discrimination, Race, Internal labor markets, Patents, Innovation

JEL Classification: D23, O31, O34, J15, D91

Suggested Citation

Hegde, Deepak and Ljungqvist, Alexander and Ljungqvist, Alexander and Raj, Manav, Race, Glass Ceilings, and Lower Pay for Equal Work (Feb 2, 2022). Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 21-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3811410 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3811410

Deepak Hegde

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Alexander Ljungqvist

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Manav Raj (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

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