Information Regime Changes and Path Dependence - An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Contributions in Heterogeneous Groups

24 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2021

See all articles by Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling

Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling

Ulm University - Department of Mathematics and Economics

Sabine Kröger

Université Laval

Erika Seki

Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics; Osaka University

Date Written: March 24, 2021

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the path dependence of voluntary contributions in a public good game with heterogeneous agents who vary in their ability to increase the public good. More specifically, we analyze whether contribution norms observed in a first phase of the experiment under a specific information regime carry over to a second phase with a more or a less transparent regime. We find evidence of path dependence that varies by the ability of agents. Efficient contribution norms establish under common knowledge about heterogeneity and transparency of contributors' ability, and they carry over to another game with less transparency. Other contribution norms that emerged under less transparency are also initially sticky, but they eventually evolve toward an efficient norm under a more transparent information regime. Thus, path dependence may impede but does not prevent ecient contribution norms to prevail in fully transparent settings.

Keywords: Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Heterogeneous MPCR, Information Transparency, Sticky Behavior, Behavioral Change, Social Norms

JEL Classification: C92, D04, D63, D79, D89, D91, H41, H49

Suggested Citation

Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde and Kröger, Sabine and Seki, Erika, Information Regime Changes and Path Dependence - An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Contributions in Heterogeneous Groups (March 24, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3811755 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3811755

Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling

Ulm University - Department of Mathematics and Economics ( email )

Helmholzstrasse
Ulm, D-89081
Germany

Sabine Kröger (Contact Author)

Université Laval ( email )

2214 Pavillon J-A. DeSeve
Quebec, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada

Erika Seki

Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

1-7 Machikaneyama
Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043
Japan

Osaka University ( email )

1-1 Yamadaoka
Suita
Osaka, 565-0871
Japan

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