Taxes and Turnout: When the Decisive Voter Stays at Home

110 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2021

See all articles by Felix Bierbrauer

Felix Bierbrauer

University of Cologne - Center for Macroeconomic Research (CMR)

Aleh Tsyvinski

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Nicolas Werquin

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized.

Suggested Citation

Bierbrauer, Felix and Tsyvinski, Aleh and Werquin, Nicolas, Taxes and Turnout: When the Decisive Voter Stays at Home (2021). CESifo Working Paper No. 8954, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3812071

Felix Bierbrauer (Contact Author)

University of Cologne - Center for Macroeconomic Research (CMR) ( email )

Cologne
Germany

Aleh Tsyvinski

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )

Nicolas Werquin

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

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