Polycentric Governance in Theory and Practice: Dimensions of Aspiration and Practical Limitations

Abstract

This paper offers a three-step (structure, process, outcome) definition of polycentric governance, a concept that constitutes the core of the research program of the Bloomington School of institutional analysis, as first articulated in the works of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom. The basic assertion of this paper is that certain kinds of fragmented governance structures, specifically those consisting of multiple authorities with overlapping jurisdictions, may impel policy actors to interact with each other through processes of mutual adjustment and continued expansion of institutional diversity in ways that may generate outcomes which exhibit positive characteristics of emergent order and scale economies. However, practical approximations of this ideal congruence of structure, process, and outcome will necessarily fall short of fully accomplishing all of these aspirations, and instead tend to fall into six traps or “failures” of polycentric governance: structural inequities, incremental bias, high levels of complexity, structural fissures, coordination failures, and, ultimately, a lack of normative clarity. Yet, even imperfect proto-polycentric systems of governance provide actors with continued access to multiple mechanisms for improvement that hold out the hope that the most negative consequences of these tendencies can be ameliorated. The paper concludes with a discussion of the merits of using polycentricity as a lens through which political, economic, and societal interactions can be seen in a new light.

Keywords: polycentricity, governance, institutional analysis, polycentric governance

JEL Classification: H10