Customer Choice and Routing in Queueing Networks

Stanford GSB Working Paper No. 1782

28 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2003

See all articles by Sunil Kumar

Sunil Kumar

Independent

Ali K. Parlakturk

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Operations Area

Date Written: January 2003

Abstract

We study self-interested routing in stochastic networks, taking into account the discrete stochastic dynamics of such networks. We analyze a two station multiclass queueing network in which the system manager chooses the scheduling rule used, and individual customers choose routes in a self-interested manner. We show that this network can be unstable in Nash equilibrium when the scheduling rule is chosen naively by the system manager. We also design a non-trivial scheduling rule that negates the performance degradation due to self-interested routing and achieves a Nash equilibrium with excellent performance.

Suggested Citation

Kumar, Sunil and Parlakturk, Ali K., Customer Choice and Routing in Queueing Networks (January 2003). Stanford GSB Working Paper No. 1782. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=381283 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.381283

Sunil Kumar (Contact Author)

Independent

No Address Available

Ali K. Parlakturk

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Operations Area ( email )

300 Kenan Center Drive
Chapel Hill, NC 27599
United States
(919) 962-3181 (Phone)

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