Taking The Constitution Away From The Supreme Court of India

2021, National Law School of India Review, Vol 33, No 1, 1-30.

30 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2021 Last revised: 21 Mar 2022

Date Written: March 26, 2021

Abstract

In very few countries worldwide, is constitutionalism confined to the apex court’s courtrooms, the way it is in India. This facet of Indian political life has been taken so much for granted that rarely have people stopped to examine whether it is even desirable. This article will argue that on a closer examination, the Supreme Court is an inefficient forum to realise the Constitution’s promises and more so in today’s political climate. On the contrary, India’s Supreme Court centric constitutionalism raises more challenges than it resolves. This article will suggest that there is an urgent need to usher in a revolution of constitutionalism outside the Supreme Court, wherein the battles regarding the Constitution are predominantly fought outside the Supreme Court rather than within. While such arguments have been made in the Anglo-American context, seldom have scholars advocated for constitutionalism outside the courts in global south countries like India, where courts are considered vital for constitutional sustenance. In departing from this trend, this article will demonstrate how although the Supreme Court might still have a crucial role to play, ‘Taking The Constitution Away From the Supreme Court’ is indispensable.

Keywords: Supreme Court, India, Constitutional Law, Constitutionalism, Legal Theory, Judicial Activism, Human Rights, Democracy, BJP, Constitutional Courts, Supreme Court of India

Suggested Citation

Sethi, Amal, Taking The Constitution Away From The Supreme Court of India (March 26, 2021). 2021, National Law School of India Review, Vol 33, No 1, 1-30., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3812918 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3812918

Amal Sethi (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg ( email )

Rothenbaumchaussee 33
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

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