Groundwater Use Decisions Are Strategic Complements
28 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2021
Date Written: February 28, 2021
Abstract
We test whether the decisions in a common-pool resource game are better modeled game-theoretically as strategic substitutes or complements using an individual-level dataset of groundwater usage that accounts for 3% of US irrigated agriculture. We find support for strategic complements, suggesting that reciprocity– and/or race-to-depletion–like dynamics are key to understanding groundwater usage.
Keywords: Common-pool resources – US agriculture – groundwater – dynamic game theory – panel data – identification
JEL Classification: Q25
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Koch, Caleb M. and Nax, Heinrich H., Groundwater Use Decisions Are Strategic Complements (February 28, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813301 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3813301
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN