Representation is Not Sufficient for Selecting Gender Diversity

33 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2021

See all articles by Justus Baron

Justus Baron

Northwestern University - Center on Law, Business, and Economics

Bernhard Ganglmair

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Junior Research Group Competition and Innovation; Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation (MaCCI); University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Nicola Persico

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Timothy Simcoe

Boston University - Questrom School of Business; NBER

Emanuele Tarantino

Luiss Guido Carli University; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 29, 2021

Abstract

Representation of women and minorities in a “selectorate” — the group that chooses an organization’s leaders — is a key mechanism for promoting diversity. We show that representation, on its own, is not sufficient for selecting gender diversity: a supportive organizational culture is also required. In the case of the Internet Engineering Task Force, a random increase in female representation in its selection committee caused an increase in female appointments only after cultural norms supporting diversity and inclusion became more salient.

Keywords: Gender, diversity, selectorate, STEM, standards

JEL Classification: D02, M14, O32, J16, J71

Suggested Citation

Baron, Justus and Ganglmair, Bernhard and Persico, Nicola and Simcoe, Timothy S. and Tarantino, Emanuele, Representation is Not Sufficient for Selecting Gender Diversity (March 29, 2021). Boston University Questrom School of Business Research Paper No. 3815038, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3815038 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3815038

Justus Baron

Northwestern University - Center on Law, Business, and Economics ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

HOME PAGE: http://justusbaron.org/

Bernhard Ganglmair

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Junior Research Group Competition and Innovation ( email )

L7,1
Mannheim, 68161
Germany

Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation (MaCCI) ( email )

L 7, 1
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

Nicola Persico

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Timothy S. Simcoe (Contact Author)

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Emanuele Tarantino

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

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