(In)excusable Backsliding under Contested Oversight

37 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2021 Last revised: 19 Apr 2024

See all articles by Robert Gulotty

Robert Gulotty

University of Chicago

Zhaotian Luo

University of Chicago, Department of Political Science

Date Written: March 30, 2021

Abstract

Threats to democracy often have a veneer of legitimacy, leaving citizens uncertain about the need to respond to democratic backsliding. We develop a model of third- party oversight bodies, such as the media or courts, that detect controversial actions, determine whether those actions are subversive to democracy, and inform citizens. We show how oversight works to deter and discipline democratic subversion by offering credible information to citizens about the behavior of incumbents. However, when the oversight body is contested, citizens can become uncertain of the intent of its criticisms. In such cases, the efforts of oversight to inform citizens can compromise its reputation and enable backsliding by stealth, what we term a fake news effect. This effect is eliminated if the incumbent is disciplined, following norms that help reassure citizens. Democratic accountability, therefore, depends not only on formal sources of information but also on adherence to norms of conduct by elected officials.

Suggested Citation

Gulotty, Robert and Luo, Zhaotian, (In)excusable Backsliding under Contested Oversight (March 30, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3815391 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3815391

Robert Gulotty

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Zhaotian Luo (Contact Author)

University of Chicago, Department of Political Science ( email )

5825 S University Ave
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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