(In)excusable Backsliding under Contested Oversight

Abstract

Threats to democracy often have a veneer of legitimacy, leaving citizens uncertain about the need to respond to democratic backsliding. We develop a model of third- party oversight bodies, such as the media or courts, that detect controversial actions, determine whether those actions are subversive to democracy, and inform citizens. We show how oversight works to deter and discipline democratic subversion by offering credible information to citizens about the behavior of incumbents. However, when the oversight body is contested, citizens can become uncertain of the intent of its criticisms. In such cases, the efforts of oversight to inform citizens can compromise its reputation and enable backsliding by stealth, what we term a fake news effect. This effect is eliminated if the incumbent is disciplined, following norms that help reassure citizens. Democratic accountability, therefore, depends not only on formal sources of information but also on adherence to norms of conduct by elected officials.