Banking Bailout Law

Banking Bailout Law, Blue Sky Blog, Columbia Law School, NY, NY (Oct. 22, 2020), available at https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/10/22/banking-bailout-law/

4 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2021

See all articles by Virág Blazsek

Virág Blazsek

University of Leeds School of Law; United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund - Office of Investment Management; George Washington University Law School

Date Written: October 22, 2020

Abstract

Bank bailouts during periodic financial crises aim to stop financial panic and restore the stability of the financial system. Even if they are undesirable, future bank bailouts are unavoidable due to political and political economy reasons, whether or not they are regulated or economically efficient. In a new book, I build on existing literature to examine the different bank bailout and resolution techniques and tools through carefully selected case studies from the U.S., the E.U., the U.K., Spain, and Hungary. The pros and cons of the different legal and regulatory options are identified in order to reconstruct a regulatory framework that might better serve countries in future financial crises.

Keywords: bank bailouts, financial stability, financial crisis

Suggested Citation

Blazsek, Virág, Banking Bailout Law (October 22, 2020). Banking Bailout Law, Blue Sky Blog, Columbia Law School, NY, NY (Oct. 22, 2020), available at https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/10/22/banking-bailout-law/, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3817731 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3817731

Virág Blazsek (Contact Author)

University of Leeds School of Law ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund - Office of Investment Management ( email )

885 2nd Ave, 5th Floor
New York, NY 10017
United States
347.334.0741 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://virag-blazsek.com/

George Washington University Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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