Entry and Exchanges of Cost Information

Posted: 20 Feb 2003

See all articles by Oliver M. Richard

Oliver M. Richard

U.S. Department of Justice - Economic Analysis Group - Antitrust Division

Olivier Armantier

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract

The literature on exchanges of information has ignored firms' entry decisions. Yet, the Federal Trade Commission recently expressed concerns that exchanges of information in business-to-business electronic platforms would adversely impact entry and, thus, consumers. When entry decisions are endogenized in a competitive Cournot model with cost uncertainty, we find results that contrast sharply with current thinking on the welfare consequences of information sharing.

Suggested Citation

Richard, Oliver M. and Armantier, Olivier, Entry and Exchanges of Cost Information. Journal of Regulatory Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=381920

Oliver M. Richard (Contact Author)

U.S. Department of Justice - Economic Analysis Group - Antitrust Division ( email )

450 Fifth Street, NW
Ninth Floor
Washington, DC 20530
United States

Olivier Armantier

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

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