Risk Retention in Securitization and Empty Creditors
46 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2021 Last revised: 22 Jun 2021
Date Written: April 12, 2021
The risk retention rule was introduced in the US and the EU as a mechanism to curb the originate-to-distribute model, associated with securitizations and the financial crisis of 2008. This paper argues that besides its original financial stability rationale, the rule has positive spillovers on debt governance and specifically on the incentives to monitor, the design of covenants and the lender’s stance during renegotiation and bankruptcy (the ‘empty creditor’ problem). Risk retention in true sale securitizations makes the strongest case for debt governance, although the existence of various options of retention appears to be associated with varying incentives. The mechanism and effects of risk retention on synthetic securitizations remain ambivalent, given the perverse incentives associated with over-insurance (negative economic ownership). However, the upcoming restriction of double hedging for synthetic STS transactions is a positive development.
Keywords: Law & Finance, Financial Regulation, Debt Governance, Securitization, Risk Retention
JEL Classification: G21, G38, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation