On the Ends of the State: Stationary Bandits and the Time Horizon in Eastern Congo

39 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2021

See all articles by Soeren Henn

Soeren Henn

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy; Innovations for Poverty Action

Christian Mugaruka

Marakuja Kivu Research

Miguel Ortiz

University of California, Berkeley

Raul Sanchez de la Sierra

University of Chicago

David Wu

University of California, Berkeley

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 8, 2021

Abstract

We show that armed actors refrain from using their power to arbitrarily steal from an economy if, and only if, the armed actors’ property rights over stealing from that economy are secure. By 2009, armed actors taxed, administered, and protected various villages in Democratic Republic of the Congo. We exploit the timing and targeting of an international military operation that permanently made taxing these villages impossible. Following the operation, these armed actors turned to violently expropriating the same villages. The findings suggest that the security of property rights over stealing, hence the stealing horizon, can sustain, or destroy, economic growth.

JEL Classification: H2,O55,P26,P48

Suggested Citation

Henn, Soeren and Henn, Soeren and Mugaruka, Christian and Ortiz, Miguel and Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul and Wu, David, On the Ends of the State: Stationary Bandits and the Time Horizon in Eastern Congo (April 8, 2021). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2021-43, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3825785 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3825785

Soeren Henn

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Innovations for Poverty Action ( email )

1731 Connecticut Ave, 4th floor
New Haven, CT 20009
United States

Christian Mugaruka

Marakuja Kivu Research ( email )

Goma
Congo, Democratic Republic of the (Zaire)

Miguel Ortiz

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Raul Sanchez de la Sierra (Contact Author)

University of Chicago ( email )

1307 E 60th st
Chicago, IL Illinois 60637
United States
9174889151 (Phone)
60637 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://raulsanchezdelasierra.com

David Wu

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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