Open Banking and the Ambiguous Competitive Effects of Data Portability

Competition Policy International, Antitrust Chronicle (2021) April

6 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2021

See all articles by Giuseppe Colangelo

Giuseppe Colangelo

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics; Stanford Law School; LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management

Oscar Borgogno

Bank of Italy; University of Turin, Faculty of Law

Date Written: April 14, 2021

Abstract

In recent years several interventions have been undertaken to encourage competition by promoting access to data and facilitating data sharing and portability. The banking sector has been usually designated as a testing ground. Indeed, data play a central role in the provision of FinTech-enabled services and, since transaction data are jealously conserved by legacy banks, the commercial viability of FinTech players is undermined by the lack of access to this essential resource. Against this backdrop, by reducing switching costs and promoting multi-homing the Open Banking has emerged as a new competitive paradigm which would allow firms and consumers to enjoy simultaneous and frictionless services and products offered by different providers. However, the sharing of account information may also favour the entry of large online platforms. Therefore, concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of data portability in fostering market competition.

Keywords: Open Banking; FinTech; Digital platforms; Competition policy; Data sharing

JEL Classification: K21, K22, K23, L15

Suggested Citation

Colangelo, Giuseppe and Borgogno, Oscar, Open Banking and the Ambiguous Competitive Effects of Data Portability (April 14, 2021). Competition Policy International, Antitrust Chronicle (2021) April, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3826444

Giuseppe Colangelo (Contact Author)

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics ( email )

Via dell'Ateneo Lucano 10
Potenza
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/home

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.stanford.edu/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/

LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, Roma 00197
Italy

Oscar Borgogno

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
00184 Roma
Italy

University of Turin, Faculty of Law ( email )

Torino
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.dg.unito.it/do/docenti.pl/Show?_id=oborgogn#profilo

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