Remedies First, Liability Second: Or Why We Fail to Agree on Optimal Design of Intermediary Liability?

in Giancarlo Frosio (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability (Oxford University Press, 2020)

12 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2021

See all articles by Martin Husovec

Martin Husovec

London School of Economics - Law School

Date Written: April 19, 2019

Abstract

Intellectual property scholars in the area of intermediary liability spent now over two decades trying to answer when an intermediary should be liable for its users’ actions. What if all this time too much emphasis was placed on the second-order issue of the optimal design? Can this question be answered without first knowing what an intermediary is/should be obliged to perform as a consequence of such legal qualification? This Chapter argues that policy debates concerning the optimal design of intermediary liability should reflect an inverse order of inquiry in order to elicit useful insights.

Suggested Citation

Husovec, Martin, Remedies First, Liability Second: Or Why We Fail to Agree on Optimal Design of Intermediary Liability? (April 19, 2019). in Giancarlo Frosio (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability (Oxford University Press, 2020), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3829549

Martin Husovec (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Law School ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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