Shadow Bank Runs

29 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2021

See all articles by David Andolfatto

David Andolfatto

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Ed Nosal

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2020

Abstract

Short-term debt is commonly used to fund illiquid assets. A conventional view asserts that such arrangements are run-prone in part because redemptions must be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. This sequential service protocol, however, appears absent in the wholesale banking sector—and yet, shadow banks appear vulnerable to runs. We explain how banking arrangements that fund fixed-cost operations using short-term debt can be run-prone even in the absence of sequential service. Interventions designed to eliminate run risk may or may not improve depositor welfare. We describe how optimal policies vary under different conditions and compare these to recent policy interventions by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve. We conclude that the conventional view concerning the societal benefits of liquidity transformation and its recommendations for prudential policy extend far beyond their application to depository institutions.

Keywords: shadow banks; bank runs; short-term debt

Suggested Citation

Andolfatto, David and Nosal, Ed, Shadow Bank Runs (August 2020). FRB Atlanta Working Paper No. 2020-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3829872

David Andolfatto

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ( email )

411 Locust St
Saint Louis, MO 63011
United States

Ed Nosal (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ( email )

1000 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States

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