Rationalizing U.S. Standardization Policy: A Proposal for Institutional Reform

Antitrust 35(2): 41-47 (Spring 2021)

7 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2021

See all articles by Jorge L. Contreras

Jorge L. Contreras

University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law

Date Written: April 19, 2021

Abstract

In the United States, national policy regarding standardization, and especially patents covering standardized products (standards-essential patents, or SEPs) is in a state of disarray. No single U.S. federal agency has authority over national policy toward standardization, nor does a coherent national standardization policy exist. Rather, policies are created ad hoc by a range of authorities, often in response to industry lobbying and in areas outside the agencies’ core competencies. The result has been a piecemeal array of conflicting and flip-flopping policies that confound private industry, harm consumers, and diminish the role of the United States as a model for the rest of the world. Rationalizing and centralizing this patchwork of policy authority would significantly improve consistency, predictability, and stability in this area of national importance.

Keywords: antitrust, standards, FRAND, patent, FTC, DOJ

Suggested Citation

Contreras, Jorge L., Rationalizing U.S. Standardization Policy: A Proposal for Institutional Reform (April 19, 2021). Antitrust 35(2): 41-47 (Spring 2021), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3830118

Jorge L. Contreras (Contact Author)

University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law ( email )

383 S. University Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0730
United States

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