Competition After Mergers Near Review Thresholds

40 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2021 Last revised: 27 Mar 2024

See all articles by Michael Weichselbaumer

Michael Weichselbaumer

Vienna University of Economics and Business

Date Written: April 21, 2021

Abstract

Size thresholds determine whether a national authority reviews a merger and separate national and supranational responsibility. Firms could pursue competition-reducing mergers before they come under any regulatory oversight. Using data on German procurement auctions, I analyse competition effects near review thresholds. Four years after a merger, competition in procurement auctions decreases after mergers that are reviewed by the German national authority, relative to mergers below the threshold. However, when acquiror and target competed in procurement auctions before the merger, competition relatively increases after a German national merger review. Anti-competitive effects after nationally reviewed mergers without pre-merger activity in procurement may get unnoticed by the authority.

Keywords: Mergers, Threshold, Competition, Auctions, Regulation

JEL Classification: K21, D44, G34, L22, L40

Suggested Citation

Weichselbaumer, Michael, Competition After Mergers Near Review Thresholds (April 21, 2021). International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 94, No. 103066, 2024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3831141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3831141

Michael Weichselbaumer (Contact Author)

Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, Wien 1020
Austria

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