Size Discount and Size Penalty: Trading Costs in Bond Markets

We show that larger trades incur lower trading costs in government bond markets (“size discount”), but costs increase in trade size after controlling for clients’ identities (“size penalty”). The size discount is driven by the cross-client variation of larger traders obtaining better prices, consistent with theories of trading with imperfect competition. The size penalty, driven by the within-client variation, is larger for corporate bonds, during major macroeconomic surprises and during COVID-19. These differences are larger among more sophisticated clients, consistent with information-based theories.

Keywords: Trading Costs, Government and Corporate Bonds, Trader Identities, Size Discount, Size Penalty

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G24

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Pinter, Gabor and Wang, Chaojun and Zou, Junyuan, Size Discount and Size Penalty: Trading Costs in Bond Markets (April 20, 2021). Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3831348 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3831348