College as a Marriage Market

Abstract

College graduates tend to marry each other. We use detailed Norwegian data to show that strong assortativity further arises by institution and field of study, especially among high earners from elite programs. Admission discontinuities reveal that enrollment itself, rather than selection, primarily drives matching by institution and field among the college-educated, and that these matches can be economically consequential. Elite professional programs, in particular, propel marginally admitted women into elite household formation: they earn substantially more themselves and match with higher-earning elite partners, becoming much more likely to join the top percentiles of household earnings while also reducing fertility. Marginal elite admission for men yields no change in partner earnings or fertility. College match-making effects are concentrated among students who attend the same institution at the same time, and are larger when opposite-sex peers are more abundant, indicating search costs in the marriage market.

Keywords: assortative mating, homogamy, marriage market, matching, household formation, search costs, returns to college, field of study, college major, college selectivity, elite education, professional education

JEL Classification: D13, I23, I24, I26, J12, J24, J31