Aversion to Breaking Rules and Migration

48 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2021

See all articles by Massimo Anelli

Massimo Anelli

Bocconi University; CESifo; IZA; Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics; Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti

Tommaso Colussi

IZA

Andrea Ichino

European University Institute

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Abstract

Migration movements may increase the geographic dispersion of the Aversion to Breaking Rules (ABR) in a population, with possible long-term economic consequences. We show this result with Italian Census data, using indicators of false birth date registrations for families of South-North migrants and remainers in the two macro-regions. Within locality√óbiennium cells, deterrence and cheating benefits are similar in the two groups and thus cheating differences are informative about the underlying ABR, as our theory suggests. We also exploit the Fascist reforms of 1926 as shocks to deterrence, offering additional information on the underlying ABR of migrant and remainer families.

JEL Classification: J61, C93, R23

Suggested Citation

Anelli, Massimo and Colussi, Tommaso and Ichino, Andrea, Aversion to Breaking Rules and Migration. IZA Discussion Paper No. 14286, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3833217

Massimo Anelli (Contact Author)

Bocconi University ( email )

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CESifo ( email )

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Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics ( email )

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Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti ( email )

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Andrea Ichino

European University Institute ( email )

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Italy

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