Generalized Sequencing Games

Posted: 26 Mar 1997

See all articles by Herbert Hamers

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Date Written: Undated

Abstract

This paper considers one-machine sequencing situations in which agents are in a fixed initial order before the processing of the machine starts. The agents are allowed to rearrange positions to save costs w.r.t. the costs given by the initial order. We will assume that the agents are not certain about the position they will take in the initial order. For these sequencing situations we introduce and characterize in two different ways the Probabilistic Equal Gain Splitting (PEGS) rule that assigns the expected cost savings to the agents.

JEL Classification: C79

Suggested Citation

Hamers, Herbert, Generalized Sequencing Games (Undated). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3839

Herbert Hamers (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4666 2660 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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