Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises

44 Pages Posted: 14 May 2021

See all articles by Sewon Hur

Sewon Hur

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

César Sosa‐Padilla

University of Notre Dame

Zeynep Yom

Villanova University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January, 2021

Abstract

We study optimal bailout policies in the presence of banking and sovereign crises. First, we use European data to document that asset guarantees are the most prevalent way in which sovereigns intervene during banking crises. Then, we build a model of sovereign borrowing with limited commitment, where domestic banks hold government debt and also provide credit to the private sector. Shocks to bank capital can trigger banking crises, with government sometimes finding it optimal to extend guarantees over bank assets. This leads to a trade-off: Larger bailouts relax domestic financial frictions and increase output, but also imply increasing government fiscal needs and possible heightened default risk (i.e., they create a ‘diabolic loop’). We find that the optimal bailouts exhibit clear properties. Other things equal, the fraction of banking losses that the bailouts would cover is: (i) decreasing in the level of government debt; (ii) increasing in aggregate productivity; and (iii) increasing in the severity of the banking crisis. Even though bailouts mitigate the adverse effects of banking crises, we find that the economy is ex ante better off without bailouts: the ‘diabolic loop’ they create is too costly.

JEL Classification: E32, E62, F34, F41, G01, G15, H63

Suggested Citation

Hur, Sewon and Sosa‐Padilla, César and Yom, Zeynep, Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises (January, 2021). Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper No. 406, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3843801 or http://dx.doi.org/10.24149/gwp406

Sewon Hur (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ( email )

2200 North Pearl Street
PO Box 655906
Dallas, TX 75265-5906
United States

César Sosa‐Padilla

University of Notre Dame ( email )

361 Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

Zeynep Yom

Villanova University

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