Families in Corporate Venture Capital

55 Pages Posted: 12 May 2021 Last revised: 1 Feb 2022

See all articles by Mario Daniele Amore

Mario Daniele Amore

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology

Samuele Murtinu

Utrecht University - School of Economics

Valerio Pelucco

Bocconi University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 16, 2021


We show that families are an engine of venturing activities: one third of corporate venture capital (CVC) deals in the US from 2000 to 2017 originated from family firms. Family firms have a distinct approach to corporate venturing: they syndicate more often, join larger syndicates, and make more proximate deals (geography- and industry-wise), especially when investing in younger ventures and when the parent organization is led by a family CEO. This investment style maps into performance results: family CVC-backed ventures exhibit a higher likelihood of successful exit, better market performance, and more valuable innovation post-IPO. After the IPO, founders are more likely to maintain control when their venture is backed by family CVC investors. At the level of the parent organization, we find that family firms generate more shareholder value than non-family firms from their CVC activities. Moreover, family CVC activities are less sensitive to an external financial shock.

Keywords: Corporate venture capital; family ownership; investment; performance

JEL Classification: G24; G32; O32

Suggested Citation

Amore, Mario Daniele and Murtinu, Samuele and Pelucco, Valerio, Families in Corporate Venture Capital (May 16, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3843842 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3843842

Mario Daniele Amore (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, MI 20136

Samuele Murtinu

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, +31 30 253 7373 3584 EC

Valerio Pelucco

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136

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