The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure: Trading Costs and Information Asymmetry

Posted: 1 Apr 2003

See all articles by Venkat Eleswarapu

Venkat Eleswarapu

Chicago Equity Partners

Rex Thompson

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Kumar Venkataraman

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

In October of 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in an effort to reduce selective disclosure of material information by firms to analysts and other investment professionals. We find that the information asymmetry reflected in trading costs at earnings announcements has declined after Regulation FD, with the decrease more pronounced for smaller and less liquid stocks. Return volatility around mandatory announcements is also lower but overall information flow is unchanged when mandatory and voluntary announcements are combined. Thus the SEC appears to have diminished the advantage of informed investors, without increasing volatility.

Keywords: Trading Costs, Information Asymmetry, Regulation Fair Disclosure, Return Volatility

JEL Classification: G14, G18

Suggested Citation

Eleswarapu, Venkat R. and Thompson, Rex W. and Venkataraman, Kumar, The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure: Trading Costs and Information Asymmetry. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=384540

Venkat R. Eleswarapu (Contact Author)

Chicago Equity Partners ( email )

United States
312 629 8628 (Phone)

Rex W. Thompson

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Kumar Venkataraman

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department ( email )

United States
214-768-7005 (Phone)
214-768-4099 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.smu.edu/kumar/

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,097
PlumX Metrics