Minority Turnout and Representation Under Cumulative Voting. an Experiment

60 Pages Posted: 14 May 2021

See all articles by Alessandra Casella

Alessandra Casella

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jeffrey Da-Ren Guo

Columbia University

Michelle Jiang

Columbia University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2021

Abstract

Under majoritarian election systems, securing participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is Cumulative Voting (CV): each voter has as many votes as open positions and can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Theory predicts that CV encourages the minority to overcome obstacles to voting: although each voter is treated equally, CV increases minority's turnout relative to the majority, and the minority's share of seats won. A lab experiment based on a costly voting design strongly supports both predictions.

JEL Classification: C92, D72, K16

Suggested Citation

Casella, Alessandra and Da-Ren Guo, Jeffrey and Jiang, Michelle, Minority Turnout and Representation Under Cumulative Voting. an Experiment (April 2021). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3846097

Alessandra Casella (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Jeffrey Da-Ren Guo

Columbia University ( email )

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New York, NY 10027
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Michelle Jiang

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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