Corporate Leniency Programs in the EU and the USA

21 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2003

See all articles by Markus Walzl

Markus Walzl

RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics)

Eberhard Feess

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinn├╝tzige GmbH

Date Written: February 2003

Abstract

We develop a model to analyze and to compare the corporate leniency programs in the EU and the USA. Both programs are based on the idea that strategic interactions between the team members can be used to increase expected fines by being generous to self-reporting firms. This is in sharp contrast to the well-known literature on self-reporting schemes with single violators where leniency can never lead to higher expected fines. Although the two programs share some common features, there are also important differences. To investigate these differences we introduce a model with two self-reporting stages, heterogenous types with respect to the amount of evidence provided, and ex post asymmetric information.

Keywords: self-reporting, optimal law enforcement, criminal teams, leniency programs

JEL Classification: D62, D82, H50, K42

Suggested Citation

Walzl, Markus and Feess, Eberhard, Corporate Leniency Programs in the EU and the USA (February 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=384740 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.384740

Markus Walzl (Contact Author)

RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) ( email )

Aachen, 52056
Germany
0049 241 809 6157 (Phone)
0049 241 809 2345 (Fax)

Eberhard Feess

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinn├╝tzige GmbH ( email )

Adickesallee 32-34
Frankfurt am Main, 60322
Germany

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