When a Coauthor Joins an Editorial Board

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2021-043/VII

33 Pages Posted: 18 May 2021

See all articles by Lorenzo Ductor

Lorenzo Ductor

University of Granada

Bauke Visser

Erasmus University Rotterdam - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam (TIR)

Date Written: May 13, 2021

Abstract

Using novel and large-scale data at the individual level, we find that an author publishes more articles when a coauthor joins an editorial board, both in the "coauthor's'" journal and in other journals. This effect is larger, the less experienced the author is, and disappears quickly once the coauthor leaves the journal's board. Of the hypotheses that we consider to explain these patterns, the signalling hypothesis is a strong contender. It argues that the temporary increase in status of the coauthor improves the plight of the author as it improves the inference that editorial boards make about the author's underlying quality. Only the favoritism hypothesis can explain that, especially at journals with low board turnover, articles published during a coauthor's stint on the editorial board receive less citations than articles published during other years.

Keywords: editorial boards, networks, collaboration, coauthor

JEL Classification: A11, A14, D71, I26, J44, O30

Suggested Citation

Ductor, Lorenzo and Visser, Bauke, When a Coauthor Joins an Editorial Board (May 13, 2021). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2021-043/VII, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3847685 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3847685

Lorenzo Ductor (Contact Author)

University of Granada ( email )

Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Campus de la Cartuja
Granada, Granada 18071
Spain

Bauke Visser

Erasmus University Rotterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+ 31 (0)10 40 81449 (81441) (Phone)
+ 31 (0)10 40 89149 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam (TIR)

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

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