Concentration of Power at the Editorial Boards of Economics Journals

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2021-044/VII

49 Pages Posted: 18 May 2021

See all articles by Lorenzo Ductor

Lorenzo Ductor

University of Granada

Bauke Visser

Erasmus University Rotterdam - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam (TIR)

Date Written: May 17, 2021

Abstract

Evolutionary arguments and incentive theory point to the importance of variety and rotation of editorial board members to stimulate innovative research. Using a unique dataset covering more than 100 economics journals over the period 1990-2011, we document trends in the incidence of multiple positions, editorial duration and institutional background for more than 6,100 board members. We put these figures into perspective using the literature on boards of directors and measures of market concentration. The picture that emerges is of a discipline with a high concentration of institutional and individual power, especially at the more prestigious journals. Evidence suggests this indeed matters: there is a strong negative association between editorial duration and journal impact.

Keywords: editorial boards, journals, concentration, power, busyness, impact

JEL Classification: A11, A14, O31

Suggested Citation

Ductor, Lorenzo and Visser, Bauke, Concentration of Power at the Editorial Boards of Economics Journals (May 17, 2021). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2021-044/VII, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3847686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3847686

Lorenzo Ductor (Contact Author)

University of Granada ( email )

Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Campus de la Cartuja
Granada, Granada 18071
Spain

Bauke Visser

Erasmus University Rotterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+ 31 (0)10 40 81449 (81441) (Phone)
+ 31 (0)10 40 89149 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam (TIR)

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

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