Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post‐war Japan

Posted: 23 May 2021

See all articles by Yupana Wiwattanakantang

Yupana Wiwattanakantang

National University of Singapore - Department of Finance ; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Vikas Mehrotra

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis

Jungwook Shim

Kyoto Sangyo University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 12, 2021

Abstract

Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely-held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes the founding family’s ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of strategic family resources.

Keywords: Family firm, Founders, Ownership, Succession, Corporate Governance, Japan

JEL Classification: G32, L26

Suggested Citation

Wiwattanakantang, Yupana and Bennedsen, Morten and Mehrotra, Vikas and Shim, Jungwook, Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post‐war Japan (January 12, 2021). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3849178

Yupana Wiwattanakantang (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore - Department of Finance ( email )

Business School
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Singapore, 117592
Singapore
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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Belgium

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5, Bygn 26
Copenhagen, 1353
Denmark

Vikas Mehrotra

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )

School of Business
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-2976 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

Jungwook Shim

Kyoto Sangyo University ( email )

Motoyama, Kamigamo, Kita-ku
Kyoto, Kyoto 603-8555
Japan

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.kyoto-su.ac.jp/faculty/professors/ec/shim-jungwook.html

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