Short Squeezes After Short-Selling Attacks

61 Pages Posted: 23 May 2021 Last revised: 28 Dec 2023

See all articles by Lorien Stice-Lawrence

Lorien Stice-Lawrence

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Yu Ting Forester Wong

City University of Hong Kong (CityU)

Wuyang Zhao

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Accounting

Date Written: December 27, 2023

Abstract

We estimate the prevalence and drivers of short squeezes after short-selling attacks. Positive returns after attacks have a disproportionate tendency to fully reverse and are accompanied by heightened short covering, consistent with the presence of short squeezes. We rule out non-squeeze drivers of these positive return reversals and show they are more likely to be accompanied by squeeze-related news articles, increased stock volatility, and disruptions in the stock lending market. Using positive return reversals as a proxy for short squeezes, we estimate that 15% of short attacks experience squeezes, and squeeze risk increases with short sellers’ visibility but decreases with the credibility of their evidence. Additionally, squeezes appear to be precipitated by actions of firms and investors, including insider purchases, share recalls, retail investor trading, and firm disclosures. Our findings quantify a material risk to activist short selling and are especially timely given recent proposed restrictions on short selling.

Keywords: negative information dissemination, short attacks, short squeezes, financial disclosure

Suggested Citation

Stice-Lawrence, Lorien and Wong, Yu Ting Forester and Zhao, Wuyang, Short Squeezes After Short-Selling Attacks (December 27, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3849581 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3849581

Lorien Stice-Lawrence (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

Yu Ting Forester Wong

City University of Hong Kong (CityU) ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong

Wuyang Zhao

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Accounting ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States
5128262698 (Phone)

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