Bureaucratic Politics in China’s Antitrust Enforcement
Angela Huyue Zhang, Bureaucratic politics in China’s antitrust enforcement, May 2014, Concurrences N° 2-2014, Art. N° 65564, https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-2-2014/foreword/bureaucratic-politics-in-china-s-antitrust-enforcement-65564
University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2021/024
Posted: 26 May 2021 Last revised: 14 Jul 2021
Date Written: May 12, 2014
Abstract
Antitrust enforcement in China is a highly pluralistic process involving officials from various central ministries and local governments with overlapping functions and divergent missions and objectives. Their incentive structure and the formal and tacit rules of the Chinese bureaucracy shape the enforcement outcome of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law.
Keywords: China, International, State Intervention, Institutions, Competition Policy
JEL Classification: K21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Angela Zhang (Contact Author)
The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law ( email )
4th Floor K. K. Leung Building
Hong Kong
Hong Kong