Vertical Integration and Bargaining: Linear vs Two-part tariffs

30 Pages Posted: 28 May 2021

See all articles by Frago Kourandi

Frago Kourandi

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens - Department of Economics

Ioannis Pinopoulos

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 24, 2021

Abstract

We examine the implications of different contractual forms for welfare as well as for firms’ profits in a framework in which a vertically integrated firm sells its good to an independent downstream firm. Under downstream Bertrand competition, the standard result of the desirability of two-part tariffs over linear contracts in terms of welfare may be reversed. We obtain that the linear contract can generate higher consumer surplus and welfare than the two-part tariff when the independent downstream firm is rather powerful in determining the contract terms. In that case, the fixed fee is negative and the integrated firm makes more profits under a linear contract than under a two-part tariff. These results do not remain robust under downstream Cournot competition. Irrespective of the mode of downstream competition, the preferred contract type of the integrated firm is always welfare superior.

Keywords: vertical integration, linear contracts, two-part tariffs, bargaining

JEL Classification: D43, L13, L14, L22, L42, L81

Suggested Citation

Kourandi, Frago and Pinopoulos, Ioannis, Vertical Integration and Bargaining: Linear vs Two-part tariffs (May 24, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3851918 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3851918

Frago Kourandi (Contact Author)

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens - Department of Economics ( email )

1, Sofokleous Str
Athens, GR- 10559
Greece

Ioannis Pinopoulos

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens - Department of Economics ( email )

1, Sofokleous Str
Athens, GR- 10559
Greece

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
20
Abstract Views
154
PlumX Metrics