Corruption and Extremism

47 Pages Posted: 26 May 2021

See all articles by Attila Gáspár

Attila Gáspár

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Tommaso Giommoni

ETH Zürich

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University

Antonio Nicolò

University of Padua - Department of Economics; University of Manchester

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 21, 2021

Abstract

This paper shows that corruption generates extremism, but almost exclusively on the opposition side. When the majority has greater ability to use corruption to obtain her favorite policy outcome from the minority, then the minority group has an incentive to select a more extreme representative because it is more unlikely that such a type will accept a bribe. On the majority side, on the other hand, the perception of more likely use of the corruption tool does not create any distortion in the choice of political representatives. We provide strong causal evidence for these novel predictions using two different types of corruption signals, in Indonesia and Brazil.

Keywords: Corruption, Extremism, Delegation, elections

JEL Classification: D72, D73

Suggested Citation

Gáspár, Attila and Giommoni, Tommaso and Morelli, Massimo and Nicolò, Antonio, Corruption and Extremism (May 21, 2021). BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper No. 2021-163, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3852839 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3852839

Attila Gáspár

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Tommaso Giommoni

ETH Zürich ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

Massimo Morelli (Contact Author)

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Antonio Nicolò

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

University of Manchester ( email )

Arthur Lewis Building
Oxford Road
Manchester, M13 9PL
United Kingdom

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