Generalized Trust, External Sourcing, and Firm Performance in Economic Downturns

Organization Science, Forthcoming

64 Pages Posted: 28 May 2021

See all articles by Bart Vanneste

Bart Vanneste

University College London

Ranjay Gulati

Harvard Business School - Organizational Behavior

Date Written: May 25, 2021

Abstract

Going beyond prior research that has focused on dyadic, party-specific trust, this study investigates the importance of generalized trust, which is not specific to a counterparty and originates from a broader context. We analyze how generalized trust at the regional level affects the extent to which a firm relies on external suppliers and the performance effects of doing so. Furthermore, we assess how these relationships are impacted by an economic downturn. We exploit differences in generalized trust across 145 regions in 12 European countries, and use data on more than a million small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) before and during the Great Financial Crisis (from 2008 to 2010). Control variables are selected via a double-selection procedure based on machine learning. We find that firms in high generalized trust regions, compared to those in low generalized trust regions, source more externally (but do not reduce external sourcing less in an economic downturn), and benefit more from external sourcing during an economic downturn.

Keywords: generalized trust, trust, interorganizational relationships, strategic alliances, partnerships, external sourcing, economic downturn, Great Financial Crisis, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), regional studies, machine learning.

Suggested Citation

Vanneste, Bart and Gulati, Ranjay, Generalized Trust, External Sourcing, and Firm Performance in Economic Downturns (May 25, 2021). Organization Science, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3853080

Bart Vanneste (Contact Author)

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Ranjay Gulati

Harvard Business School - Organizational Behavior ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 317
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-8554 (Phone)
617-496-6568 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.hbs.edu

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
91
Abstract Views
560
Rank
538,335
PlumX Metrics