Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: Theory and Application

80 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2021 Last revised: 10 Oct 2022

See all articles by Xiang Han

Xiang Han

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics

Onur Kesten

University of Sydney

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 1, 2022

Abstract

In 56 developing and developed countries, blood component donations by volunteer non-remunerated donors can only meet less than 50% of the demand. In these countries, blood banks rely on replacement donor programs that provide blood to patients in return for donations made by their relatives or friends. These programs appear to be disorganized, non-transparent, and inefficient. We introduce the design of replacement donor programs and blood allocation schemes as a new application of market design. We propose novel blood allocation mechanisms that accommodate fairness, efficiency, and various other allocation objectives, together with the possibility of endogenizing exchange rates between received and donated blood units beyond the classical one-for-one exchange. These mechanisms also provide correct incentives for the patients to bring forward as many replacement donors as possible. This framework and the class of mechanisms are applicable to general settings of multi-unit exchange of indivisible goods with compatibility-based preferences beyond blood allocation.

Keywords: Blood transfusion, market design, multi-unit exchange, dichotomous preferences, endogenous pricing

JEL Classification: D47, C78, D82, D78, I19

Suggested Citation

Han, Xiang and Kesten, Onur and Ünver, M. Utku, Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: Theory and Application (October 1, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3858158 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3858158

Xiang Han

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

Onur Kesten

University of Sydney ( email )

University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia

M. Utku Ünver (Contact Author)

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.bc.edu/utku-unver

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
126
Abstract Views
567
rank
322,823
PlumX Metrics