Innovation and Antitrust: An Evolutionary and Historical Perspective

Concurrences: Herbert Hovenkamp Libor Amicorum: The Dean of American Antitrust Law 229 (Nicolas Charbit & Sébastien Gachot eds., 2021)

60 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2021 Last revised: 20 Oct 2021

See all articles by Thomas Jeffrey Horton

Thomas Jeffrey Horton

University of South Dakota, School of Law

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

Throughout the history of the United States, the importance of innovation to economic growth has been well-recognized, and the role of market economics and antitrust law, in addition to patent laws, are critical to fostering innovation. This paper examines the theories of mid-20th century economist Joseph Schumpeter, who proposed that policies favoring large firms and monopoly structures best promote innovation. In this paper, Schumpeter's theories are viewed through lenses of economic theory, history, and evolutionary biology. In viewing innovation through this interdisciplinary approach, the author shows that, in contrast to Schumpeter's thesis, innovation is, in fact, driven by robust horizontal competition, with dominant actors playing a smaller role. As such, the author argues that U.S. antitrust law should be enforced with the goal of promoting modest concentration and fostering a competitive marketplace, so as to best achieve innovation and economic growth.

Keywords: antitrust law, innovation, economic theory, competition, market economics, evolutionary analysis, Joseph Schumpeter, legal history

Suggested Citation

Horton, Thomas Jeffrey, Innovation and Antitrust: An Evolutionary and Historical Perspective (2021). Concurrences: Herbert Hovenkamp Libor Amicorum: The Dean of American Antitrust Law 229 (Nicolas Charbit & Sébastien Gachot eds., 2021), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3858979

Thomas Jeffrey Horton (Contact Author)

University of South Dakota, School of Law

414 East Clark St.
Vermillion, SD 57069-2307
United States

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