A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects
ISER DP No. 1134
22 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2021
Date Written: June 2, 2021
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.
Keywords: Multi-object allocation problem, Strategy-proofness, Efficiency, Minimum price Walrasian rule, Non-quasi-linear preference, Heterogeneous objects.
JEL Classification: D82, D47, D63
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation