A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

ISER DP No. 1134

22 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2021

See all articles by Ryosuke Sakai

Ryosuke Sakai

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: June 2, 2021

Abstract

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.

Keywords: Multi-object allocation problem, Strategy-proofness, Efficiency, Minimum price Walrasian rule, Non-quasi-linear preference, Heterogeneous objects.

JEL Classification: D82, D47, D63

Suggested Citation

Sakai, Ryosuke and Serizawa, Shigehiro, A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects (June 2, 2021). ISER DP No. 1134, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3859893 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3859893

Ryosuke Sakai (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )

6-1, Mihogaoka
Suita, Osaka 567-0047
Japan

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8558 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

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