Explaining De Facto Judicial Independence

Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeitraege des Fachbereichs No. 46/03

34 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2003

See all articles by Bernd Hayo

Bernd Hayo

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Abstract

Judicial Independence (JI) as factually implemented varies considerably between countries. Since de iure JI is an imperfect predictor of de facto JI, a number of variables that might determine the factual level of judicial independence is theoretically discussed and empirically tested. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short run and those that are the result of historical development and are exempt from short-term modification is made. Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables promises to be policy-relevant because attempts to make judiciaries more independent within governance programs might be seriously constrained by factors beyond the control of national governments and international organizations.

Keywords: Judicial independence, informal institutions, formal institutions

JEL Classification: D72, D78, H11, K42

Suggested Citation

Hayo, Bernd and Voigt, Stefan, Explaining De Facto Judicial Independence. Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeitraege des Fachbereichs No. 46/03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=386085 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.386085

Bernd Hayo

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 24
Marburg, D-35032
Germany
++49(0)6421-28-23091 (Phone)
++49(0)6421-28-23193 (Fax)

Stefan Voigt (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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