Political Equilibrium with Private Or/And Public Campaign Finance: A Comparison of Institutions

61 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2003

See all articles by John E. Roemer

John E. Roemer

Yale University - Department of Political Science; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: March 2003


We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party membership by contributing money to a party, and where a member's influence on the policy taken by her party is proportional to her campaign contribution. The polity consists of informed and uninformed voters: Only informed voters join parties, and the party campaign chest, the sum of its received contributions, is used to advertise and reach uninformed voters. Parties compete with each other strategically with respect to policy choice and advertising. We propose a definition of political equilibrium, in which party membership, citizen contributions, and parties' policies are simultaneously determined, for each of four financing institutions, running a gamut between a purely private, unconstrained system, to a public system in which all citizens have equal financial input. We compare the representation and welfare properties of these four institutions.

Keywords: Political Equilibrium, Campaign Finance, Representation

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Roemer, John E., Political Equilibrium with Private Or/And Public Campaign Finance: A Comparison of Institutions (March 2003). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1409. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=386087

John E. Roemer (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States
203-432-5249 (Phone)
203-432-6196 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jer39/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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