Trust in the Executive: Requiring Consensus and Turn-Taking in the Experimental Lab

Durant, Thomas Clark, Michael Weintraub, Daniel Houser, and Shuwen Li. 2018. "Trust in the executive: Requiring consensus and turn-taking in the experimental lab." Journal of Peace Research 55(5): 609-624.

47 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 2021

See all articles by Thomas Clark Durant

Thomas Clark Durant

Warrington College of Business, UF

Michael Weintraub

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia

Daniel Houser

Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science

Shuwen Li

Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) - Antai College of Economics and Management

Date Written: June 8, 2021

Abstract

Why is it so hard to get opposing elites to work together rather than to seek partisan gains and/or political survival? While the credible commitment problem is widely known, there are a number of lesser known obstacles to building trust and trust worthiness between opposing elites. This article presents an account of how some of those obstacles interact through time. Common institutional types, particularly winner-take-all and power-sharing institutions, force trade-offs between agile responses in the short-term and medium term trust between elites, on the one hand, and between trust among elites in the medium term and the adaptability of agreements in the long term, on the other. We call this the ‘time horizon trilemma.’ As an alternative approach, we considera variant on the two-person consulate used by the Roman Republic for more than 400 years as Rome rose to prominence. In our variant, a ‘turn-taking institution,’ opposing executives take short alternating turns as the ultimate decision-maker within one term. We conduct behavioral games in the experimental lab to provide an initial estimate of the impact of these institutional types - winner-take-all, requiring consensus only, requiring turn-taking only, or requiring both - on overcoming obstacles to agile responses in the short term, trust among elites in the medium term, and adaptability of agreements in the long term. We find that turn-taking is a promising alternative to solving the time horizon trilemma.

Suggested Citation

Durant, Thomas Clark and Weintraub, Michael and Houser, Daniel and Li, Shuwen, Trust in the Executive: Requiring Consensus and Turn-Taking in the Experimental Lab (June 8, 2021). Durant, Thomas Clark, Michael Weintraub, Daniel Houser, and Shuwen Li. 2018. "Trust in the executive: Requiring consensus and turn-taking in the experimental lab." Journal of Peace Research 55(5): 609-624., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3862894

Thomas Clark Durant

Warrington College of Business, UF ( email )

PO Box 117165, 201 Stuzin Hall
Gainesville, FL 32610-0496
United States
2027256963 (Phone)

Michael Weintraub (Contact Author)

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia ( email )

Carrera Primera # 18A-12
Bogota, DC D.C. 110311
Colombia

Daniel Houser

Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science ( email )

5th Floor, Vernon Smith Hall
George Mason University
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
7039934856 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~dhouser/

Shuwen Li

Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) - Antai College of Economics and Management

1954 Huashan Road
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Shanghai, Shanghai 200030
China

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