Time Pressure and Regret in Sequential Search

52 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2021

See all articles by Felix Klimm

Felix Klimm

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU)

Martin G. Kocher

University of Vienna

Timm Opitz

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Simeon Schudy

Ulm University; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

Perceived urgency and regret are common in many sequential search processes; for example, sellers often pressure buyers in search of the best offer, both time-wise and in terms of potential regret of forgoing unique purchasing opportunities. Theoretically, these strategies result in anticipated and experienced regret, which systematically affect search behavior and thereby distort optimal search. In addition, urgency may alter decision-making processes and thereby the salience of regret. To understand the empirical relevance of these aspects, we study the causal effects of regret, urgency, and their interaction on search behavior in a pre-registered, theory-based, and well-powered experiment. We find that urgency reduces decision times and perceived decision quality but does not alter search length. Only very inexperienced decision-makers buy earlier when pressured. Anticipated regret does not affect search length (neither with nor without time pressure), while experienced regret leads to systematic adjustments in search length. Thus, we recommend that consumer protection policies should particularly focus on markets with inexperienced first-time buyers.

JEL Classification: C910, D010, D030, D180, D830

Suggested Citation

Klimm, Felix and Kocher, Martin G. and Opitz, Timm and Schudy, Simeon, Time Pressure and Regret in Sequential Search (2021). CESifo Working Paper No. 9122, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3863825 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3863825

Felix Klimm (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, DE Bavaria 80539
Germany

Martin G. Kocher

University of Vienna ( email )

Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

Timm Opitz

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Simeon Schudy

Ulm University ( email )

Albert-Einstein-Alee 11
Ulm, D-89081
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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