Detection of Collusive Networks in E-procurement

43 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2021

See all articles by Bruno Baranek

Bruno Baranek

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Vítězslav Titl

Utrecht University - School of Economics

Leon Musolff

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 10, 2021

Abstract

Collusion likely has adverse effects on social welfare. In this paper, we study collusion in the e-procurement market in Ukraine. We document that the bidding patterns in the data are incompatible with a competitive equilibrium. We develop a novel structural test to detect pairs and, thereby, networks of collusive firms. We validate the soundness of our collusion detection algorithm on a sample of 863 prosecuted collusive firms that participated in 23,515 tenders.

Keywords: Public procurement, Collusion, Online markets

JEL Classification: D44, H57

Suggested Citation

Baranek, Bruno and Titl, Vítězslav and Musolff, Leon, Detection of Collusive Networks in E-procurement (June 10, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3864186 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3864186

Bruno Baranek

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Vítězslav Titl (Contact Author)

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, +31 30 253 7373 3584 EC
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.titl.name

Leon Musolff

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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