How do Investors React to Biased Information? Evidence from Chinese IPO Auctions

Abstract

We study how institutional investors utilize potentially biased information by analyzing the effect of IPO underwriters' earnings forecasts on investors' bidding behaviors in Chinese IPO auctions. Despite the presence of upward biases in underwriters' earnings forecasts, we nd that investors' bid prices are higher in IPOs with higher earnings forecasts. The investors' positive reaction to biased information can be explained in a rational expectation model where the underwriter has valuable information about the IPO but has a biased incentive in presenting the information to investors. Consistent with the model's predictions, we find that an investor's bid price is more sensitive to the underwriter's earnings forecast when the forecast bias is expected to be smaller, when the relative precision of the underwriter's information over the investor's information is higher, and when the investor has a higher valuation of the IPO.

Keywords: IPO, analysis forecast, information asymmetry, financial intermediary

JEL Classification: G14, G23, G24