Regulation of Cartels in Emerging Economies: Optimal Enforcement Options for Nigeria

(2020) 5(3) Miyetti Quarterly Law Review, 11-37

22 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2021

Date Written: June 12, 2021

Abstract

Prior to the return of democracy in 1999, the Nigerian economy was characterised by government-sponsored monopolies and subsidies in key sectors of the economy. This led to the concentration of market power in the hands of few firms. Post-1999 marked a departure from that norm and the commencement of a new policy direction towards a free-market economy, with successful attempts made at deregulating the economy. However, the country continued to suffer from the anticompetitive practices of these few dominant firms, owing to the absence of a competition law regime.

With the enactment of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act (FCCPA) 2019, and the establishment of a competition regulator, this article undertook a critical analysis of the provisions on cartels, especially, the leniency and settlement procedures. It made a comparative study of the 20-year-old regime in South Africa (SA), an emerging economy that has recorded giant strides in cartel regulation, and argued that notwithstanding the criticisms and disadvantages of the leniency program and settlement procedure, their benefits outweigh the setbacks. In sum, the article identified a number of murky areas of cartel regulation in the new Nigerian competition law, made appropriate recommendations, and suggested the best optimal enforcement models.

Keywords: Regulation, Cartel, Emerging Economies, Nigeria

JEL Classification: K21, K23

Suggested Citation

Uwadi, Enyinnaya, Regulation of Cartels in Emerging Economies: Optimal Enforcement Options for Nigeria (June 12, 2021). (2020) 5(3) Miyetti Quarterly Law Review, 11-37, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3865652

Enyinnaya Uwadi (Contact Author)

University of East Anglia ( email )

UEA
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom
NR4 7TJ (Fax)

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