Dynamic Transparency and Rollover Risk

61 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2021 Last revised: 23 Jun 2021

See all articles by Xu Wei

Xu Wei

Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE)

Zhen Zhou

Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance

Date Written: June 14, 2021


Regulatory disclosures, such as supervisory bank stress tests, are pre-scheduled and conducted on a regular basis to improve transparency and enhance market discipline. We build a dynamic model with asymmetric information to investigate the effectiveness of such regulatory disclosures. We find that banks and bank creditors strategically respond to the anticipated information from pre-scheduled disclosure by shortening debt maturity and requesting higher interest rates, thereby intensifying rollover risk. This negative consequence can outweigh the positive effect from screening out bad investments and make the regulatory disclosure ineffective in promoting stability and efficiency, especially when the improvement of transparency is only moderate and when the market possesses little information about individual banks' financial soundness. Our study highlights the limited effectiveness of pre-scheduled disclosure during a crisis time, provides a rationale for the BOE's and EBA's suspension of regular supervisory stress tests during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, and sheds light on a better design of regulatory disclosure.

Keywords: Regulatory Disclosure, Transparency, Rollover Risk, Stress Tests, Maturity Mismatch, COVID-19

JEL Classification: G01, G14, G21

Suggested Citation

Wei, Xu and Zhou, Zhen, Dynamic Transparency and Rollover Risk (June 14, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3866986 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3866986

Xu Wei

Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE) ( email )

39 South College Road
Haidian District
Beijing, Beijing 100081

Zhen Zhou (Contact Author)

Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance ( email )

No. 43, Chengdu Road
Haidian District
Beijing 100083

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