Ownership and Control of Polish Listed Corporations

27 Pages Posted: 23 May 2003

See all articles by Piotr Tamowicz

Piotr Tamowicz

Gdansk Institute for Market Economics

Maciej Dzierzanowski

Gdansk Institute for Market Economics

Date Written: October 2002

Abstract

With the company-level data on listed and unlisted companies we analyse ownership and control of the Polish corporations. We find that voting control in listed corporations is remarkably concentrated with the median size of the largest block amounting to 39.5%. A sustainable concentration trend has been observed over the whole last decade. Other companies and individuals/families (mostly founders) dominate among the largest blockholders of Polish corporations. Banks' involvement in control is below common expectations. It is also observed that - especially in smaller firms - managerial ownership is quite large. Frequently, managers are also the company founders and first or second largest blockholder. The extent of ownership and control separation is very modest, however the statutory arrangements for all companies have not been analysed. The most popular device to leverage control over ownership is preferred (dual-class) share issues. Control through subsidiaries is applied to a lesser extent. The presence of the large blockholders in listed corporations puts the issue of minority rights and potential conflict of interests on the agenda. Our analysis shows that the Polish capital market is in a desperate need of improvement in this respect, as well as for a new strategy to increase its liquidity.

Keywords: ownership, control, corporate governance, Poland

JEL Classification: G3, G32

Suggested Citation

Tamowicz, Piotr and Dzierzanowski, Maciej, Ownership and Control of Polish Listed Corporations (October 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=386822 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.386822

Piotr Tamowicz (Contact Author)

Gdansk Institute for Market Economics ( email )

Corporations & Innovations Department
ul. Do Studzienki 63
Gdansk 80227
Poland

Maciej Dzierzanowski

Gdansk Institute for Market Economics ( email )

Corporations & Innovations Department
ul. Do Studzienki 63
Gdansk 80227
Poland
+48-58-341-15-35 (Phone)
+48-58-341-06-20 (Fax)

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